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Abstract This paper presents a model of familial altruism in which labor
supply is chosen endogenously. The model is used to address the predictions
of Ricardian Equivalence, both theoretical and empirical. It is argued that,
to the extent that income variation in the data comes mostly from wage and
effort changes, the empirical tests of neutrality are misspecified. Numerical
estimates suggest that quantitatively important deviations from neutrality may
be at work.
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1 Introduction
The literature on altruism and the family greatly expanded since Becker’s
(1974) pathbreaking contribution. Family economics has shed light on a
number of very diverse economic problems, ranging from the real effects of
redistributive intergenerational tax policies to the motives behind the residen-
tial choice of young adults, their labor market experiences and human capital
accumulation. The cornerstone of this literature typically features a parent
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with altruistic feelings regarding his offspring and examines the allocation of
resources that will materialize through household interaction (Becker 1974).
This simple framework suffices to generate a great many number of implica-
tions. Those concerning intergenerational transfers (from parent to child and
vice-versa) have been the object of very intense scrutiny, especially given their
stark implications for fiscal policy first expressed in Barro (1974).
One well-known prediction of the basic altruism model is Ricardian Equiv-
alence, according to which income redistribution within the family will not
alter the economic allocation prevailing previous to it. That is, if one dollar
were taken from the child’s income and given to the parent, in a lump-sum
fashion, the latter would simply raise the transfer he was previously giving by
exactly one dollar. Thus, nothing would change in the allocation of goods and
time prevailing before redistribution. This occurrence has also been labeled as
“redistributive neutrality.”
Ricardian Equivalence has often been cast in terms of a difference in trans-
fer derivatives: the difference between the derivative of the parental transfer
function with respect to parental income minus the derivative with respect
to the child’s income should equal unity. This result has received enormous
empirical scrutiny and been almost unanimously rejected as the estimated
difference in transfer derivatives is typically found to be much below unity.1
A related body of literature examining the relationship between transfers
and labor supply has emerged. For example, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) examine
the predictions of the “Carnegie conjecture,” according to which recipients of
large estates would reduce their labor supply, and find the data to be support-
ive of this assertion. In a similar vein, Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) examine
the impact of inheritances, actual and expected, on labor supply. They find that
labor supply is indeed reduced by inheritances but that the quantitative effect is
small. Sloan et al. (2002) propose a model where the child may give the parent
money or time. She does not derive utility from leisure, but the opportunity
cost of time—her wage—naturally affects her choice across types of transfers.
While the wage is an empirically significant variable determining monetary
transfers to the parent, it does not statistically affect time transfers.2 Dustmann
and Micklewright (2001) examine the relationship between parental monetary
transfers and the labor supply choices of teenagers. They find that parental
1The immense literature on micro-models of family transfers has a very good survey in Laferrère
and Wolff (2006), which also includes a section on empirical tests. Arrondel and Masson (2006)
review the empirical evidence on transfers and compare it with the predictions of altruism,
exchange and indirect reciprocity. Perhaps the most well-known empirical piece on the transfer
derivative test is Altonji et al. (1997) but the examples are very numerous as can be seen in both
surveys. The empirical literature on altruism is briefly discussed in Section 4.
2As the authors point out, this result is in line with theory: a higher wage raises the child’s
opportunity cost of time and this effect counteracts the wealth effect also associated with the
higher wage. The net effect is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view, thus not contradicted
by an estimated coefficient not significantly different from zero.
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transfers reduce the hours worked and the participation rates of children.3 This
literature thus globally suggests that the allocation of time is not independent
of intra-family financial flows. The goal of this paper is to study the joint
determination of labor supply and financial transfers within the family.
Naturally, the possibility that intra-family transfers are not altruistically
motivated has also received a great deal of attention in the literature. Laferrère
and Wolff’s survey of transfer motives divides those motives into three broad
categories: altruism, exchange and mutuality. In models of exchange, first
introduced by Bernheim et al.’s (1985) idea that bequests are payment for the
child’s attention, and consolidated by Cox (1987), the parent values a service or
activity undertaken by the child. Financial transfers to the child may therefore
reflect payments in exchange for those services or activities. One well-known
possibility is that transfers respond positively to the child’s income, as higher
income raises the child’s opportunity cost from performing the services appre-
ciated by the parent. Further, since income redistribution modifies the bargain-
ing power of household members (and thus the transfers required to pay for
the child’s services), the exchange model does not deliver a neutrality result.
Empirical work by Cox (1987), Cox and Raines (1985) and Cox and Rank
(1992) found transfer amounts to depend positively on recipient’s income.
The mutuality framework considers the emergence of transfers between
generations as the result of a (possibly unwritten) contract or constitution that
guides rights and obligations in the extended family. Consolidated by Cigno
(1993, 2000), and surveyed in Cigno (2006), the mutuality model postulates
a game between the generations of an extended family. Parents find it in
their interests to care for their own parents for the game’s strategy dictates
that “delinquent” progenitors will not receive future assistance from their
children. Thus, transfers across generations are set by the requirements of
the family’s constitution. In principle, transfers amounts are also part of the
family’s contract and, therefore, should not change with small perturbations
of the environment. (Family members will choose to either participate in the
transfer contract or not at all.) Again, no presumption of neutrality follows in
this environment. Cigno et al. (1998, 2006) find empirical evidence supporting
mutuality motives in transfer behavior (the probability of providing transfers
is greater for those who are credit constrained and transfer amounts are
insensitive to donor’s income). While not dismissing in any way the predictions
of the exchange and mutuality environments, the goal of the present paper is
to reexamine the altruism model after introducing the explicit consideration
of endogenous labor supply and, in doing so, to reconsider the validity of the
associated empirical tests.
This paper proposes a model of familial altruism in which labor supply is
chosen endogenously. Two versions of the model are considered: one where
the child can adjust hours worked and another where hours are held fixed but
3Using French panel data, Wolff (2006) finds no significant influence of parental transfers on the
labor supply of their children.
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the distribution of wages depends on a level of effort that is privately observed
by the child. Regarding the endogenous choice of hours, the model illustrates
the important distinction that must be made between income sources as far as
neutrality results are concerned. While redistribution of nonlabor income in
this context is mostly neutral (provided the parent makes transfers to the child
before and after it takes place) and redistributive neutrality applies, neutrality
is not a well-defined concept when income changes associated with wage
variation are considered. In the data, however, one important source of income
variation across households comes from wage variation and corresponding
adjustment of hours worked. The analysis provides a formula relating the rele-
vant parameter for the redistributive neutrality test with the one presumed to
actually emerge from most empirical studies. Illustrative calculations suggest
both that the difference is nonnegligible but also that this correction does not
rescue the implications of the altruism model: controlling for wages would
raise the unity benchmark of the difference in parental transfer derivatives,
making it all the more difficult to reconcile the predictions of altruism with
the very low empirical estimates for that difference. The difference in transfer
derivatives when income variation comes exclusively from wage changes (and
the endogenous response of hours) exceeds the Ricardian reference value of
unity by 50% for the benchmark case.
Under the private information version of the model, income variation no
longer comes from changes in wages and hours worked but from labor market
luck. The distribution of income can however be influenced by the child’s
privately observed effort, with worse luck being less likely under high effort.
Under general assumptions, it is easy to show that the difference in transfer
derivatives should be strictly below unity, as found in the data. The reason for
this is the need for the parent to provide incentives for the exertion of high
effort on the part of the child: the parent will reward high income realizations
relatively more than low realizations and move away from the typical purely
compensatory role of an altruistic parent under perfect information.4 To
assess the relevance and plausibility of private information, the counterfactual
mean income level associated with low effort is estimated. Calculations in the
benchmark case place the child’s mean income under low effort level at 84%
of mean income under high effort, and the percentual income reduction could
reach 66% of mean income attained under high effort for some parameter
values. Further, under private information it is possible to obtain a positive
response of parental transfers to the child’s income, a feature driven by the
relative likelihood that certain income values would have been the result of
high versus low effort.
The empirical estimates of transfer functions that are used to test the altru-
ism model would arguably correspond to an estimate of an average transfer
4McGarry (2000) is another example where neutrality breaks down due to the informational
content of different income observations. In her model, the child’s current income provides
information regarding her future income. Different current income realizations therefore imply
a shift in expectations regarding future income and this causes neutrality to fail.
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function prevailing for a representative family. Introspection readily suggests
that both forces—endogenous response of hours to wage variation and private
information—are at work in the real world. This work shows that we should
not expect to encounter, even under only slight deviations from the simplest
form of the altruism model, deviations that incorporate realistic dimensions
of labor supply, unitary differences in transfer derivatives unless we could
control for wages and private information. As results in Sections 2 and 3 show,
this is not evidence that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold since testing
that result would require lump-sum income redistribution across generations,
a very different source of income variation compared to the cross-section
income changes that can be recovered from micro data. Our quantitative
results suggest opposing forces may be at work, with the endogenous response
of hours to wages biasing empirical estimates upward and private information
biasing results in the opposite direction.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model of labor supply
with complete information. Section 3 addresses the private information case.
The empirical literature is discussed in Section 4, where numerical results
illustrating the results in the two previous sections are also presented. Section 5
concludes.
2 The effort-enlarged Barro-Becker model
In this section, I extend the benchmark Barro-Becker model of altruism to
include the endogenous choice of labor supply.
2.1 The model
Consider a family formed of an altruistic parent, p, and a selfish child, c. For
simplicity, it is assumed that only the child works. Let the constant λ take
values in [0.5, 1]. Given a consumption pair
(
cp, cc
)
, and the child’s effort e,
the parent’s total utility U p is:
U p = λU
(
cp
) + (1 − λ) u (cc, 1 − e) . (1)
The direct utility functions U (·) and u (·) are C2 and satisfy Inada conditions.
The parent’s total utility U p is a weighted average of his direct utility from
consumption, U (·), and the child’s total utility, u (·).5 Both family members
enjoy consumption while the child dislikes effort.
5The restriction λ ∈ [0.5, 1] arises naturally if we interpret the parent’s utility from consumption as
U
(
cp
) ≡ u (cp, 1 − ep
)
,
with ep set to a constant (possibly zero). The values of λ now reflect a partially altruistic parent, one
who loves himself more than his child. Though this is the utility representation we favor, the results
would hold for any parental utility function U p (·) with the general properties outlined in the text.
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The parent receives exogenous income Ip ∈ R+, whereas the child’s total
endowment is the sum of the exogenous component Ic and the labor payments
we, with (Ic, w) ∈ R2+. Given Ip, Ic and the market wage w, the parent chooses
a nonnegative transfer to the child, T, as well as the child’s working hours, e.
For simplicity, it will be assumed throughout that income and wages are such
that optimal effort is interior.
The child’s consumption is then:
cc = Ic + we + T, (2)
while the parent consumes
cp = Ip − T. (3)
Optimal transfers and working hours solve6
max
T≥0,e∈[0,1]
λU
(
Ip − T
) + (1 − λ) u (Ic + we + T, 1 − e) . (4)
First-order conditions are:
λU ′
(
Ip − T
) ≥ (1 − λ) u1 (Ic + we + T, 1 − e) , (5)
which holds at equality whenever transfers are strictly positive, and
u1 (Ic + we + T, 1 − e) w = u2 (Ic + we + T, 1 − e) . (6)
2.2 Results
I will first consider the redistributive neutrality experiment. In the spirit of
Barro (1974), this experiment amounts to an exogenous relabelling of income
in which some quantity δ is taken from one generation’s income and added to
the income of the other generation, for example by means of governmental
intervention. In what follows, I will consider taking one dollar from the child’s
(nonlabor) income and adding it to the parent’s. The question asked under this
experiment is then “What would the parental transfer be if the parent knew
that, when the triple
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
is realized, one dollar of nonlabor income will
be redistributed in the way just described?” Transfers will neutralize income
redistribution if the transfer after income redistribution corresponds to an
increment of exactly one dollar over the no-redistribution amount.
Let T
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
denote the optimal transfer function provided by the
parent in the absence of redistribution, and let T˜
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
denote the corre-
sponding schedule when redistribution takes place. Similarly, let e˜
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
6In the spirit of the Barro-Becker tradition, the effort-enlarged model presented here has all the
decision making ability centralized in the parent. Since the child is selfish, it would be desirable
to allow the child to select effort and to model the interaction between family members as a
game. In Fernandes (2000), I model the interaction between parent and child as a noncooperative
static game. It is shown that the unique Nash-equilibrium of that game replicates exactly the
optimal parental choices of the current model. This is so since the parent cares for the child in
a nondistortionary way: conditional on a transfer amount, parent and child would agree on the
optimal amount of hours the child should work.
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and e
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
denote the effort choices with and without redistribution,
respectively. Notation generalizes for consumption. Transfers are neutral if
T˜
(
Ip, Ic,w
) = T (Ip, Ic, w
) + 1.
The neutrality experiment does not necessarily correspond to verifying how
the initial transfer menu T (·) responds under two dif ferent income pairs,(
Ip, Ic
)
and
(
Ip + 1, Ic − 1
)
. As will be made clear below (see Section 3), if the
family operates under an asymmetric information environment, for example,
the two experiments generally yield different results. The source of this
distinction hinges on the fact that redistribution is an exogenous phenomenon:
transfers possibly adjust to it but family members know which income values
were initially in place. The evaluation of the initial transfer menu under
different income values entails a possibly different scenario, if family members
perceive alternative endowment points as different. This will be the case
when the child’s income depends in a nondeterministic way on her privately
observed effort: income draws are informative about the child’s diligence.
Proposition 1 (Ricardian Equivalence under Complete Information) For(
Ip, Ic, w
)
triples such that T
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
> 0, T˜
(
Ip, Ic, w
) = T (Ip, Ic, w
) + 1,
e˜
(
Ip, Ic, w
) = e (Ip, Ic, w
)
.
Proposition 1 states that transfers neutralize income redistribution. The
proof follows from verifying that T˜ and e˜ solve the system of first-order
conditions of the parent’s problem, Eqs. 5 and 6. Naturally, this implies c˜c = cc
and c˜p = cp. This result obviously generalizes to any nonnegative amount
δ ≤ Ic redistributed in the way just described.
The following Proposition compares the initial transfer schedule under
two dif ferent income pairs,
(
Ip + 1, Ic − 1, w
)
and
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
. The question
answered here is “How does the parental transfer under
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
compare
with the transfer the parent will provide if, in turn,
(
Ip + 1, Ic − 1, w
)
occurs?”
Proposition 2 (Transfer Slope under Complete Information) For
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
triples such that T
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
> 0, T
(
Ip + 1, Ic − 1, w
) = T (Ip, Ic, w
) + 1,
e
(
Ip + 1, Ic − 1, w
) = e (Ip, Ic, w
)
.
The proof is identical to the one of the previous Proposition. This result
states that the optimal transfer schedule offsets perturbations of familial
income which leave the sum Ip + Ic constant.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we have that
T˜
(
Ip, Ic, w
) = T (Ip + 1, Ic − 1, w
) = T (Ip, Ic, w
) + 1.
In fact, in the present environment devoid of information asymmetries, the two
experiments—comparing T˜ (·) with T (·) and comparing T (Ip + 1, Ic − 1, ·
)
with T
(
Ip, Ic, ·
)
—yield the same result. Once again, this is true for any non-
negative income amount δ redistributed within the family. Using the fact that
T
(
Ip + δ, Ic − δ,w
) = T (Ip, Ic, w
) + δ
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holds for all δ, and letting δ become arbitrarily small, the result of the
comparison of T under different income draws can be summarized using
“local” notation by saying
T1 − T2 = 1 and e1 = e2,
thus allowing us to label Proposition 2 in terms of the “slope” of the transfer
function.
It should be clear that Ricardian Equivalence results hold when redistribu-
tion is carried out in a lump-sum fashion. Ricardian Equivalence does not offer
any quantitative prediction for the difference in transfer derivatives should
income changes be associated with variation in wages and the corresponding
adjustment of hours worked. Providing a quantitative benchmark for the
difference T1 − T2 under the assumption that income aggregates involving
labor income have been used in empirical work is the goal of Section 4.1.
All parameter configurations considered in that section show that T1 − T2
exceeds unity when the variation in the child’s resources comes mostly from
labor income.
We now proceed to the environment with private information.
3 Private information
In this section, I assume that the child’s effort is privately observed and exam-
ine the implications of asymmetric information for the behavior of transfers
(see Fernandes (1999) for further details). Other models of the family under
asymmetric information include Chami (1996, 1998). This work deviates from
the existing literature by focussing on the implications of private information
for transfer behavior, with particular emphasis on the consequences of income
redistribution within the family.7
3.1 The model
In the current scenario, parent and child play a sequential game as follows.
The parent’s income Ip ∈ R+ is now assumed to be random and distributed
7Chami (1996) argues that, when the child’s effort is privately observed, the parent will be able to
induce a higher level of effort from the child if he is able to precommit to a transfer amount as
opposed to deciding on a transfer to the child after effort is undertaken. His result thus provides
conditions under which Hirshleifer’s (1977) assertion that the parent must act after the child’s
effort is implemented in order to prevent her from shirking—or acting “rotten”–is overturned;
it is driven by the fact that the parent can no longer observe the child’s effort. In his (1998)
piece, Chami again examines the implications of parental transfers and transfer regimes for the
intensity of labor supply. The analysis considers a large number of alternative scenarios which
include private information and/or merit goods. Chami does not address the question of interest
here, namely the effect of private information on the properties of transfers regarding income
redistribution and, further, how these results compare with empirical estimates. Gatti (1997)
considers a model of bequests under private information and examines how different transfer
regimes—related to the parents’ ability to commit—affect the utility of the parents.
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according to probability density function μ (·), defined over R+.8 Effort e is
understood here as the intensity with which the child works a fixed number of
hours. There is randomness in the wage rate she receives, and the distribution
of the wage depends on this intensity. Since hours are fixed, there is no real
distinction between the wage and her labor income. For notational simplicity,
Ic denotes the child’s total income, drawn from probability density function
f (Ic; e) with support in R+.9 Effort can take values in E = {eH, eL}, eH > eL.
The density f (Ic; eH) dominates– in the first-order stochastic sense – f (Ic; eL);
further, μ (·) and f (·) are statistically independent.
The timing is as follows. The parent moves first and announces a menu
of transfers T
(
Ip, Ic
)
, which depends on the future realizations of the en-
dowments. The child then selects a privately observed effort level e, e ∈ E.
Income realization Ip is drawn from μ (·) whereas Ic is drawn from f (·; e).
Both income realizations are publicly observed. Once the income realizations
take place, transfers are implemented according to the announced menu, T (·).
Transfers translate into consumption in the obvious way:
cp = Ip − T
(
Ip, Ic
)
, cc = Ic + T
(
Ip, Ic
)
. (7)
Momentary utility has the same form as before,
U p = λU
(
cp
) + (1 − λ) u (cc, 1 − e) ,
where u (cc, 1 − ec) represents the child’s total utility.
Given the timing of moves, the parent takes into account how the promised
menu affects the child’s choice of effort. Let Ee denote the expectations
operator induced by μ (·) f (·; e). The parent maximizes his expected utility
by choice of the child’s effort level e and transfer menu T
(
Ip, Ic
)
, subject to
the child being indifferent between exerting e or its complement ec:
max
T(·)≥0,e∈E
Ee
{
λU
(
cp
) + (1 − λ) u (cc, 1 − e)
}
(8)
subject to
Eeu (cc, 1 − e) ≥ Eec u
(
cc, 1 − ec
)
, for e, ec ∈ E, (9)
as well as Eq. 7.
8There is a technical reason for why the parent’s income is now stochastic. In Section 2, the
income of parent and child was observed before the parental transfer was given or effort exerted.
Comparing the parental transfer for different values of the family’s income was a straightforward
experiment. In this section, the timing of moves—described below—prescribes the parent an-
nouncing a transfer menu of payments which are contingent on the future observations of Ip and
Ic. If Ip is drawn from a degenerate distribution, then the experiment of taking one dollar from
the child’s income and adding it to the parent’s is not well-defined. In other words, the multiplier
θ of the incentive compatibility constraint (9) would be a function of Ip as opposed to a function
of its distribution, as it is in the current case.
9If there is a nonlabor component in the child’s earnings, as it was the case in Section 2, it is
assumed that the parent knows how much it totals.
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Equation 9 is the incentive compatibility condition. I assume that this
constraint is binding and also that eH solves the problem stated in Eqs. 8 and 9.
Let θ denote the strictly positive multiplier associated with Eq. 9.
The optimal transfer menu T
(
Ip, Ic
)
satisfies the following first-order
condition:
−λU ′(cp) + u1 (cc, 1 − eH)
[
(1 − λ) + θ
(
1 − u1 (cc, 1 − eL)
u1 (cc, 1 − eH)
f (Ic; eL)
f (Ic; eH)
)]
≤ 0,
(10)
which holds at equality whenever T is strictly positive.
Define F (Ic) ≡ f (Ic; eL) / f (Ic; eH), commonly known as the likelihood
ratio. Let U1 (cc) stand for the ratio of marginal utilities from consumption
associated with different effort levels, U1 (cc) ≡ u1 (cc, 1 − eL) /u1 (cc, 1 − eH),
U1 (·) > 0. When transfers are positive, we may now rewrite the first-order
condition as:
λU ′(cp) = u1 (cc, 1 − eH) [(1 − λ) + θ (1 − U1 (cc) F (Ic))] . (11)
Inspection of the previous equation shows that, holding other things con-
stant, the child will be rewarded when the odds that a particular realization of
Ic was obtained under eH are high. In fact, a low value of F (Ic) indicates that
the probability of Ic being drawn from high effort is large relative to f (Ic, eL).
In turn, a low ratio F (Ic) raises the ratio of the parent’s marginal utility over
the child’s.
Regarding the term U1 (cc), for separable utility functions U1 (·) is simply a
constant (unity). When the child’s utility is not separable in consumption and
leisure, U1 (·) is a marginal utility correcting factor which takes into account
how the different effort levels affect the child’s marginal utility from con-
sumption. For example, if leisure raises the marginal utility from consumption,
then U1 (cc) > 1. The mentioned complementarity between consumption and
leisure will cause the parent not to compensate the child as much for high effort
since her marginal utility from consumption is lowered by the child’s diligent
activity. When U1 (·) > 1, this effect, therefore, goes in the opposite direction
of a low ratio F (Ic).
Consider now the redistribution experiment of taking one dollar from the
child’s income and adding it to the parent’s endowment. As in Section 2, the
question here is “What would the parent’s transfer be if the parent knew
that, upon
(
Ip, Ic
)
taking place, one dollar would be redistributed within the
family?” Denote by T˜
(
Ip, Ic
)
the new transfer menu under redistribution. The
following proposition shows that redistribution is neutral if parents provide
positive transfers for all income realizations.
Proposition 3 (Ricardian Equivalence Under Private Information) If the den-
sity functions μ
(
Ip
)
, f (Ic; eH) and f (Ic; eL) are such that T
(
Ip, Ic
)
> 0, for all
realizations of
(
Ip, Ic
)
, then T˜
(
Ip, Ic
) = T (Ip, Ic
) + 1.
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The need to restrict the result to densities such that transfers are always
positive can be understood as follows. If that were not the case, income redistri-
bution for realizations
(
Ip, Ic
)
such that transfers are zero would not be undone
by the parent. In turn, given that redistribution changes the consumption
allocation for at least some of the income realizations, this would also change
the “cost” for the parent of making the initial transfer function incentive
compatible. In other words, the multiplier associated with the the incentive
compatibility constraint would also change. In being at least partially effective,
redistribution is modifying the initial conditions, it is having an effect compa-
rable to a change in μ (·). It is worth emphasizing, however, that redistribution
does not affect the parent’s perception of how hard the child works. That is, the
ratio F (Ic), which adjusts parental compensation in order to give the child hard
working incentives, remains unchanged under the redistribution experiment.
This is the key fact underlying neutrality, provided transfers are positive for all(
Ip, Ic
)
pairs.
A different question concerns the properties of the initial transfer menu,
T
(
Ip, Ic
)
, in the following sense. When comparing two dif ferent income pairs,(
Ip, Ic
)
and
(
Ip + 1, Ic − 1
)
, say, is it also the case that transfers fully offset
the income changes? Since it is feasible for the parent to increase the transfer
from T
(
Ip, Ic
)
to T
(
Ip, Ic
) + 1, would this be a property of optimal transfers?
The answer to this question is “no” and the intuition is as follows. The
different income realizations of the child have associated different values of
F (·). This causes the parent to perceive Ic and Ic − 1 as different, and the
insurance/incentives trade-off described above will reward the child relatively
more under Ic, if F (Ic) is lower than F (Ic − 1).
By fully differentiating the first-order condition (11) and imposing dIp =
−dIc, one obtains the slope of the transfer menu across income pairs
(
Ip, Ic
)
such that Ip + Ic is constant. The result is:
dT
(
Ip, Ic
) =
(
1 − u1 (cc, 1 − eH) θU1 (cc) F
′ (Ic)
D
)
, (12)
with D, the denominator in the previous expression, given by:
D = λU ′′ (cp
) + u11 (cc, 1 − eH) [(1 − λ) + θ (1 − U1 (cc)) F (Ic)]
−u1 (cc, 1 − eH) θU ′1 (cc) F (Ic) .
As Eq.12 indicates, the “slope” of the transfer menu will generally deviate
from unity, the value which would entail a complete offset of the income
perturbations. The sign of the ratio in Eq. 12 hinges on the signs of F ′ (·) and
U ′1 (·). Having F ′ (·) < 0, a condition know in the literature as the monotone
likelihood ratio property, is a sufficient condition for f (·; eH) to first-order
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stochastically dominate f (·; eL).10 The derivative of the ratio U1 (·) would
be zero if u (c, e) = log (c) − e, for example. Having F ′ (·) < 0 and U ′1 (·) ≥ 0
is sufficient for dT
(
Ip, Ic
)
< 1.11 This implies that transfers less than fully
compensate the child for income losses, even when the family’s total income
remains constant. This result is summarized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4 (Transfer Slope under Private Information) If (i) the density
functions μ
(
Ip
)
, f (Ic; eH) and f (Ic; eL) are such that T
(
Ip, Ic
)
> 0, for all
realizations of
(
Ip, Ic
)
, (ii) the family of densities f (Ic; e) satisf ies the monotone
likelihood ratio property, and (iii) U ′1 (·) ≥ 0, then the dif ference T1 − T2
between the derivatives of the transfer function T
(
Ip, Ic
)
is smaller than unity.
From an algebraic point of view, the transfer slope deviates from unity
to the extent that θ F ′ (Ic) = 0. The relevance of the factor F ′ (I) = 0 can be
understood as follows. Loosely speaking, when the income perturbation takes
place, we are comparing two endowment pairs,
(
Ip, Ic
)
and
(
Ip + 1, Ic − 1
)
.
The optimal transfer payment, constrained to provide incentives for eH to be
exerted, forces transfers to depend on F (Ic). The derivative F ′ (·) reflects the
need to adjust the transfer payment as a function of the relative likelihood
that low effort was exerted. For example, for Ic values such that F ′ (Ic) < 0,
the drop in the child’s income will not be fully compensated by the parent
(dT
(
Ip, Ic
)
< 1). The reduction in the child’s post-transfer income ensures
that her incentives for hard work remain effective.
It is also instructive to decompose the total transfer differential following
an increment in Ip matched by an equal size reduction in Ic in its two parcels:
dT/dIp and dT/dIc. Since, in the model, there is no private information asso-
ciated with the donor’s income, transfers respond to changes in Ip as predicted
by altruism: they increase with the donor’s income. However, changes in the
child’s income will deviate from the benchmark of “pure altruism” since the
parent must reward higher income in order to make eH more attractive than
shirking. One possibility of interest is that of a positive response of transfers
to the child’s income. That is, could dT/dIc be positive? The sign of dT/dIc
is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view and it is conceivable that, for
some parameter values and income realizations, the derivative of parental
transfers with respect to the child’s income were positive: parental transfers
10If the family of densities f (·|e) satisfies the monotone likelihood property, then, for all I1c ≥ I0c
and eH ≥ eL,
f
(
I1c |eH
)
f
(
I1c |eL
) ≥ f
(
I0c |eH
)
f
(
I0c |eL
) . (13)
That is, the ratio of the probabilities that Ic occurs under high and low effort is increasing in Ic.
The ratio of probabilities in the first-order condition, F (Ic), is the reciprocal of that in Eq. 13, and
thus the monotone likelihood ratio property implies that F (·) is decreasing in Ic.
11Note that, from the first-order condition for transfers, Eq. 11, we know that the expression in
square brackets in the denominator D is strictly positive when transfers are also strictly positive.
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could respond positively to the child’s income due to the need of conveying
incentives. This possibility also casts the earlier results of Cox and coauthors—
who found transfer amounts to vary positively with the recipient’s income—in
a new light:12 although a positive sign of dT/Ic is consistent with exchange,
it is also consistent with altruism in the presence of private information. In
the quantitative exercise of the next section, dT/dIc was in fact found to be
positive for all parameter values considered.
Along the same lines, Proposition 4 shows that the difference in transfer
derivatives will be less than unity, but it does not restrict its value. Since
transfers respond positively to parental income, a very low—and even possibly
negative—value for T1 − T2 would be more likely provided dT/dIc were
positive. Another interesting possibility, not ruled out by the model, would
be for transfers to respond negatively to the child’s income at low values
of Ic, where differences in marginal utilities across family members might
dominate over incentives, but to increase with Ic above a certain threshold,
if the incentives motive started to dominate then. Some authors identified this
transfer pattern in the data. (See e.g. Cox et al. (2004), with data from the
Phillipines, and Wolff (1998), using French data.) Private information thus
suggests multiple paths for reconciling altruism with transfer behavior and
overturns the assertion in Arrondel and Masson (2006) that “Parental altruism
cannot explain noncompensatory gifts or bequests.”
Could θ be zero, so that parent and child preferred the same effort choice? It
is definitely a possibility. A binding incentive compatibility constraint depends
on the fact that parent and child disagree over the effort choice. This could
happen in the current setup since the child’s effort choice affects the parent’s
expected utility via the probability distribution from which Ic is drawn. Such
disagreement was absent from Section 2 since the child’s effort did not affect
the child’s wage or her nonlabor income.
The question—“What is the slope of the transfer menu across pairs of
family income with the property that the sum Ip + Ic is constant?”–is quite
pertinent in view of the interpretation that one may attribute to estimates of
transfer functions from panel data. In fact, the data used to estimate transfer
functions will typically consist of observations of
(
Ip, Ic
)
for each family in
the panel. Once demographic and taste elements have been controlled for,
this empirical exercise corresponds to an estimate of the transfer function
T
(
Ip, Ic
)
. As described in Section 4, tests of redistributive neutrality have
been performed by comparing estimates of T1 − T2 with the benchmark value
of unity, allegedly implied by the null. As shown above, this procedure does
not capture the redistributive neutrality result. Under the light of information
asymmetries, it at best provides an estimate of how parental transfers react to
information on the child’s effort.
In view of the previous discussion, it is not surprising that redistributive
neutrality has been overwhelmingly rejected in the empirical literature. A
12See also the results in Jürges (1999).
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reference value for the difference in transfer derivatives, obtained by estimat-
ing a transfer function using panel data, can be found in Altonji et al. (1997).
The estimates produced by that study indicate that T1 − T2 does not exceed 13
cents, a very small magnitude compared to the expected dollar.13
4 Quantification
In this section, the results from the empirical literature are analyzed under
the light of endogenous labor supply. Two questions are asked here. First,
we start from the realization that most empirical studies are not able to
identify nonlabor income and rely, instead, on measures that include labor
income. This being the case, what would the quantitative implications for
redistributive neutrality under perfect information be? Stated differently, if
most empirical tests have used measures of labor income in their estimates of
T1 − T2, what should the value of the resulting estimate have been? Should
we expect T1 − T2 to be larger or smaller than unity? And how does the
“new” benchmark compare with actual estimates? While the altruism model
described in Section 2 has clear predictions for this derivative difference if
nonlabor income is used, no prediction is available for T1 − T2 under income
variation arising from wage changes and the corresponding endogenous re-
sponse in hours worked. To answer this question, we parameterize the utility
functions of parent and child with a common functional form, assume standard
parameter values and evaluate consumption and transfers at mean sample
values reported in empirical studies to come to an estimate of T1 − T2.
Second, we consider the polar case of the incomplete information model,
where all variation in income comes from luck and there is no change in hours
worked. We adopt actual estimates of T1 − T2 from the empirical literature.
Having done so, we solve for the mean of the counterfactual income distribu-
tion that would have prevailed had the parent not provided incentives for the
child to work hard. By comparing it with mean income of the true distribution
of earnings, we get a quantitative sense of the relevance of private information.
The functional form chosen for the utility function of the parent (which of
course includes the child’s) is:
U p = λ
cαp
α
+ (1 − λ)
[
cαc
α
+ γ (1 − e)
ω
ω
]
. (14)
In Section 4.1 on complete information, e will correspond to the fraction of
time spent working, whereas in Section 4.2, where incomplete information is
considered, it will correspond to the intensity of effort.
13Other researchers, who also estimate transfer functions (for example McGarry and Schoeni
(1995, 1997)) report—at least heuristically—that the implied difference in transfer derivatives falls
far short of the neutrality benchmark.
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4.1 Complete information
A substantial part of recent empirical work on altruism has devoted attention
to the properties of financial and time transfers between parents and their adult
children. Some examples of this literature include Altonji et al. (1996, 1997),
McGarry and Schoeni (1995, 1997), Cox (1987), Cox and Raines (1985) and
Cox and Rank (1992).
In Section 2, optimal transfers from parent to child were shown to take
the form T
(
Ip, Ic, w
)
, and to verify redistributive neutrality. One possible
empirical approach, in order to estimate transfer functions, would be to
specify a functional form for the transfer equation, taking into account how
demographic factors such as family size and age composition may affect the
propensity and amount of transfers. Generalizing the transfer function to
depend on the parent’s wage,14 I now use wp to denote the parent’s wage and
similarly for the child’s. One could then write the following empirical equation:
T = α + β1 Ip + β2 Ic + γ1wp + γ2wc + δp Xp + δc Xc + u, (15)
where X denotes a vector of demographic variables and u is a random
disturbance assumed to be drawn from a known distribution. In this context,
T represents the amount of financial transfers from parents to their children.
The parameters in Eq. 15 could then be estimated from data on a cross-section
of households. Theory predicts that β1 − β2 = 1—redistributive neutrality—
while no particular numerical value is assigned to the difference γ1 − γ2.
The properties of transfers have been analyzed using versions of Eq. 15 of
the following form:
T = a + b 1 ISp + b 2 ISc + d1 Xp + d2 Xc + v, (16)
where the superscript S indicates total income: the sum of labor and nonlabor
income. The child’s total income, in the notation of Section 2, is then ISc =
Ic + we. Thorough empirical experimentation has estimated Eq. 16 using
several different possibilities for the income variables, including current and
permanent income.
In all the work cited here, reference has been made to the redistributive
neutrality test. Redistributive neutrality has been interpreted as the statement
that the difference between the transfer derivatives with respect to parent and
child’s income should equal unity. Using the notation of the test equation
above, this translates into b 1 − b 2 = 1. As mentioned above, Altonji et al.’s
estimates of this difference do not exceed 13 cents.
The Barro-Becker model, enables us to relate the parameter of interest
concerning redistributive neutrality, the coefficient β2 in Eq. 15, with the
14The model of Section 2 did not consider the choice of parental labor supply. By including the
parent’s wage in the empirical Eq. 15, I am considering here the more realistic generalization of
the model, with parents participating in the labor market and earning wage wp.
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parameter actually estimated, b 2, from Eq. 16. The child’s total income relates
to labor income as follows:
ISc = Ic + we.
Suppose that the exogenous component of ISc is very small, so that most of the
changes in ISc are due to changes in wages and corresponding labor supply
adjustment.15 Then, changes in ISc relate to changes in the wage rate w as
follows:
dISc =
[
1 + w
e
∂e
∂w
]
edw. (17)
Let ηe,w stand for the elasticity of labor supply with respect to changes in the
wage. Then, we may rewrite Eq. 17 as follows:
dw = dI
S
c(
1 + ηe,w
)
e
. (18)
From the model of Section 2, desired transfers depend on the wage rate as
well as on the exogenous income components, Ip and Ic . It can be shown that
the derivative of parental transfers with respect to the child’s wage takes the
form:
∂T
∂w
=
[
∂T
∂ Ic
− ∂e
∂ Ic
u1
λU ′′e
]
e.
Using Eq. 18, we get:
∂T
∂ ISc
=
[
∂T
∂ Ic
− ∂e
∂ Ic
u1
λU ′′e
]
1
(
1 + ηe,w
) . (19)
Leaving aside the implications of using the functional form in Eq. 16 to
estimate the transfer function in Eq. 15, one may think of the number given
in Eq. 19 as the expression that was actually estimated.16 Recall that the
redistributive neutrality property applies to the term ∂T/∂ Ic. In fact, the model
of an altruistic parent and his child predicts ∂T/∂ Ip − ∂T/∂ Ic = 1. Using the
notation of the test equations, we may rewrite Eq. 19 as:
∂T
∂ ISc
=
[
β2 − ∂e
∂ Ic
u1
λU ′′e
]
1
(
1 + ηe,w
)  b 2. (20)
It is worth comparing the actual estimate b 2 with β2. The term in brackets is
more negative than ∂T/∂ Ic, from the assumption that leisure is normal. On
15Whether or not Ic is small does not affect the substance of the results presented here, while
simplifying the exposition.
16The actual estimate, without the assumption that Ic is small, would be an weighted average of
the coefficient presented in Eq. 19 and ∂Tp/∂ Ic.
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the other hand, to the extent that the elasticity of labor supply is positive
(negative), this reduces (raises) the absolute magnitude of actual estimates. If
the effect of the labor supply elasticity dominates, in the sense of outweighing
the effect of the second parcel of Eq. 20, then b 2 will be strictly smaller than
β2, in absolute value. Since neutrality tests have been performed by computing
the difference ∂T/∂ ISp − ∂T/∂ ISc , and the estimates of ∂T/∂ ISc have generally
been found to be negative, “compressed” estimates of ∂T/∂ ISp and ∂T/∂ I
S
c
due to the dampening effect of the labor supply wage elasticity could help
explain the very low value of the “test” results, which have been found to
be significantly below unity. Although estimates of male labor supply wage
elasticities tend to be negative, female labor supply elasticities are positive and
more elastic (see below). The number ηe,w represents the wage elasticity of
the child’s household. As such, when head and spouse are present, it will not
correspond exactly to any of these estimates but will instead reflect their joint
hours’ response to wage changes.
The objective of the current section is to provide an estimate of b 1 − b 2
and compare it with results from the empirical literature. If the parent has no
ability to choose hours worked, b 1 will coincide with β1. Since, from a life-
cycle point of view, parents are more likely to have stabler jobs relative to
their children, this is not an unrealistic approximation. We therefore present
results for the difference β1 − b 2. The numerical strategy was one of evaluating
the main quantities of the model—consumption of parent and child, hours
worked, transfers and so on—using mean values from the PSID, as reported
in Altonji et al. (1996, Table A2-1). Consumption of parent and child were
set to their permanent income values minus (plus) transfers given (received);
transfers from parent to child equaled the difference between total transfers to
children net of their transfers to parents.
We set α to −1, corresponding to an elasticity of intertemporal substitution
of 0.5, a common value in the literature. Given the values of cp, cc and λ, the
first-order equation for positive transfers
λcα−1 = (1 − λ) cα−1c (21)
provides an estimate of λ, 0.6234, within the range of values consistent with
partial altruism (λ ∈ (0.5, 1]).
Total yearly hours worked equal an endowment H, minus the hours that
the household head spent unemployed as reported in Altonji et al. (1996). The
endowment H is set to 3000, the product of 50 weeks of 40 hours times 1.5;
the underlying assumption is that members of the child’s household take two
weeks of vacation off and the spouse works half-time.17 The fraction of time
spent working, e, is the ratio of the number of hours worked over H.
The child’s budget constraint reads:
cc = Ic + T + we.
17Results are virtually insensitive to the choice of H.
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Thus, the wage w represents the product of the hourly wage times the total
time endowment H. The hourly wage is computed by dividing permanent
earnings by hours worked; w is the product of the hourly wage and the yearly
time endowment H.
Given α, the values of ω and γ are related through the first-order condition
for hours:
cα−1c w = γ (1 − e)ω−1 ⇐⇒ ω =
(α − 1) ln cc + ln w − ln γ + ln (1 − e)
ln (1 − e) . (22)
Parameters ω and γ are found by imposing that the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the wage equal a target number and that Eq. 22 be satisfied. The
target value for the wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.1. Blundell et al. (1998)
provide estimates of female labor supply ranging from 0.13 to 0.371 (table IV).
In Borjas (1996, pp68), the wage elasticity of labor supply for males is negative,
−0.1, whereas that of females is positive, of about 0.2. The elasticity to use
for calibration purposes should be an average across household members. We
start with 10% and later discuss the sensitivity of results to this number.
Table 1 shows the results of the simulations for the benchmark case in the
third column (λ = 0.62). Comparison of the estimates of β2 with b 2 shows that
the latter is over twice as large as the former in absolute value. The last row
of the table provides estimates of the difference between β1 and b 2. For the
benchmark case, the difference exceeds by 50% the unity reference value cor-
responding to redistributive neutrality. It thus appears that failing to consider
the endogenous adjustment of hours to wage variation causes the difference in
income derivatives to deviate significantly from unity, though not in a way that
would help the neutrality hypothesis. In fact, endogenous labor supply leads to
an increase in the coefficient of interest of about 50% in the benchmark case.
The other columns of Table 1 estimate the coefficient of interest with
alternative values of λ, ranging from 0.55 to 0.7. For λ values exceeding 0.7,
no well-defined numerical solution was found (either ω was estimated above
unity, making the utility function convex with respect to leisure, or complex
Table 1 Redistributive neutrality under complete information
λ 0.55 0.6 0.62 0.65 0.7
γ (×104) 0.1236 0.1374 0.1449 0.1541 0.1746
ω 0.8920 0.9231 0.9385 0.9568 0.9932
η∗e,w 0.1003 0.1003 0.1003 0.1004 0.1007
β1 0.4691 0.5532 0.6022 0.6718 0.9133
β2 −0.5309 −0.4468 −0.3978 −0.3282 −0.0867
b 2 −0.8221 −0.8577 −0.8955 −0.9722 −1.4067
β1 − b 2 1.2912 1.4108 1.4977 1.6440 2.3200
Parameter values: α = −1, H = 3000
∗ηe,w is the wage elasticity of labor supply, a target value of the computations
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roots were found for γ , or both).18 We see that, as λ increases, so does the
difference β1 − b 2, a difference which exceeds unity for all cases considered.19
Lower values of α (e.g. α = −1.25) deliver similar results. As we raise
α, however, the difference β1 − b 2 declines. Interestingly, for α = 0.5 (the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals 2 in this case), the difference
β1 − b 2 is very close to unity. For this value of α, the corresponding value of
λ that solves Eq. 21 equals 0.53. For λ values ranging from 0.53 to 0.85, the
difference β1 − b 2 ranges between 1.08 and 1.17. Just as in the other cases
studied, β1 − b 2 is increasing in λ and exceeds unity for all λ values. Thus,
there are parameter values under which the endogenous choice of hours does
not significantly affect the predicted value of β1 − b 2 relative to the unity
benchmark corresponding to redistributive neutrality.
The results are sensitive to the target value of the wage-elasticity of labor
supply as follows. The difference of interest—β1 − b 2—declines as the target
value of ηe,w is lowered toward zero. For example, for α = −1 and imposing a
target value for ηe,w of 0.05, we have that β1 − b 2 equals 1.26, an important
reduction from the benchmark value of 1.5, though still significantly above
unity. The reduction of β1 − b 2 as ηe,w is lowered generalizes to all the cases
considered. For α = 0.5, for example, the estimate of β1 − b 2 already close to
unity when ηe,w was set to 10% is further lowered to 1.04 when we target 5%
instead.20
The results of this section globally suggest that the omission of endogenous
labor supply does not rescue the redistributive neutrality hypothesis, as far
as empirical results are concerned: the gap between the empirically estimated
transfer derivative difference and the theoretically expected coefficient (quan-
tified above) appears greater than previously thought.
4.2 Incomplete information
The results under private information show that the difference β1 − β2 should
be strictly smaller than unity. The endogenous effort dimension of labor supply
18Empirical evidence directly targeted at the determinants of well-being and happiness, such as
Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005) and Bruhin and Winkelmann (2009), has identified positive
and significant effects of the well-being of the child on the parent’s. The estimates of the altruism
parameter in Schwarze and Winkelmann would imply higher values for λ, in agreement with
the indirect evidence uncovered in Bruhin and Winkelmann. The quantification under private
information below considers higher λ values.
19It may appear surprising that the coefficient β1 is increasing in λ, since the greater its value the
more selfish the parent. The reason this is the case is the fact that, as λ increases, what is being
kept constant is the combination of γ and ω values such that ηe,w equals a target value of 0.1. If
those were kept constant, β1 would decrease with λ (and so would β2).
20For negative values of ηe,w , well-defined solutions are only found for negative values of α.
Further, for these values of α, the range of λ values for for which solutions exist is usually very
high, in particular significantly higher than the value of λ that would set the first-order condition
of transfers at equality. For example, for α = −1 and λ = 0.8, β1 − b 2 equals 1.83. This difference
declines as λ increases further. We find the admissible range of values for λ implausibly high and
therefore disregard these cases.
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thus offers a way of reconciling theory and data. To assess the importance of
private information, we estimate the mean income associated with the low-
effort income distribution, which the child would have earned if she had not
exerted effort. First, we disregard the endogenous change in hours and take
the model under private information as the “true model.” Later in this section,
we discuss ways of bringing both models together from a quantitative point of
view.
Our strategy is as follows. We take the empirical estimates of T1 − T2 as
given, and set it to 0.13, as reported in Altonji et al. (1997). The model of
private information provides an expression for the difference in transfer deriv-
atives in Eq. 12. Beyond parameters of the utility function and consumption
values, this equation is a function of the distribution of income under high
and low effort. It depends also on the Lagrangian multiplier θ of the incentive
compatibility constraint. The first-order condition for transfers under private
information, Eq. 11, depends on the same quantities. Therefore, upon suitable
parameterization of the distribution of income, these two equations could in
principle be used to back out information about the counterfactual distribution
of income associated with shirking.
In order to do so, we posit that income under high effort is lognormally
distributed, with parameters
(
μ, σ 2
)
. Further, we assume that low effort leads
to a reduction in the mean of the income distribution to μc, with μc < μ.21 We
set μ to the mean of permanent earnings, as reported in Altonji et al. (1996).
The standard deviation of log earnings is obtained from Daly and Valetta
(2003) and set to σ = 0.63. After solving the first-order condition Eq. 11 for
the multiplier θ and inserting the result into Eq. 12, we solve the latter for μc.
Before reporting the estimates, we note that the value of λ used in the
previous computations was derived by setting the first-order condition with
respect to transfers at equality, in the model of complete information. That
is, given the magnitudes for cp and cc found in the data, λ was a root to the
relation
λu′(cp) = (1 − λ) u′ (cc) , (23)
where separability of consumption and leisure is already incorporated. How-
ever, the first-order condition for transfers under private information, Eq. 11,
is instead
λu′(cp) = u1 (cc) [(1 − λ) + θ (1 − F (Ic))] .
Therefore, if the value of λ that solved Eq. 23 were used, it would force the
multiplier θ to zero and/or set μc to equal μ, so that F (Ic) equaled unity. If
a meaningful solution to the private information case is to be found, we must
allow λ to exceed the benchmark value selected under complete information.
In what follows, we consider three values of λ, corresponding to 10, 20 and
30% increments over the full information benchmark. Given these values,
21It is straightforward to show that F ′ (Ic) < 0 obtains if μc < μ .
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Table 2 Redistributive
neutrality under private
information
Parameter values: α = −1,
μ = 10.645, σ = 0.63
∗ Target value of the
computations
λ 0.69 0.75 0.81
θ 2.51 1.70 1.53
μc 10.47 10.33 10.23
E (Ic|μc)
E (Ic|μ) ∗100 83.56 72.94 65.94
β1 0.44 0.44 0.44
β2 0.31 0.31 0.31
(β1 − β2)∗ 0.13 0.13 0.13
and using the consumption numbers from above (corresponding to average
PSID values), we then look for values of μc that solve Eq. 12 once θ has been
substituted out. Results are reported in Table 2.22
Given our assumption that income is lognormally distributed, its expected
value when high effort is exerted equals exp
(
μ + σ 2/2). Thus, the ratio
(exp (μc) / exp (μ)) ∗ 100 measures the fraction of mean income associated with
the distribution with low effort relative to mean income when high effort is
exerted instead. This information is also included in Table 2 in the row labeled
(E (Ic|μc) /E (Ic|μ)) ∗ 100. The table also includes the figures obtained for β1
and β2 (in addition to their difference).
For the lowest value of λ, deviating only 10% from the benchmark case of
the previous section, we find that mean income associated with the low effort
distribution corresponds to 84% of mean income of the actual distribution of
earnings, a sizable income reduction. Comparative statics with respect to λ—
given by columns 2 and 3 of Table 2—show that μc decreases with λ, leaving
mean income under low effort at only 66% of mean income under μ for the
highest value of λ. The same comparative statics emerge when other values of α
are considered. The size of the income reduction increases with α. For α = 0.5,
for example, the income reduction is more sizeable, ranging between 61 and
41% of mean income under μ (from lowest to highest λ). The table shows that
β2, the transfer derivative with respect to the child’s income, is positive. This
reflects the need to compensate for the child’s diligence. The value of β2 was
found to be positive under all parameter combinations. The magnitude and
sign of transfer derivatives—with respect to Ip and Ic—are virtually insensitive
to different values of α and σ .
The results for μc vary negatively with σ but they are very stable in this
dimension. With α = −1 and σ = 0.4, for example, mean income under μc
ranges between 84 and 69% of mean income under μ; for σ = 0.8, instead, the
corresponding values range between 83 and 65%. The same pattern emerged
when other values of α were considered.
The logic presiding this quantitative exercise—taking an estimate of T1 − T2
from the empirical literature and finding parameter values that would match
that number—was also attempted in the previous section, under complete
information. There, however, no set of parameter values could target the
22Results were obtained using Matlab’s routine ‘fsolve’ and the code is available upon request.
They were insensitive to initial conditions.
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empirical estimate of 13 cents found in Altonji et al. (1997) (complex values
were found for ω and γ in these cases).
Endogenous hours and private information Next, we examine the implica-
tions of endogenous hours as “measured” by the quantitative results of the pre-
vious section. The models of Sections 2 and 3 provide two independent forms
of considering endogenous labor supply: endogenous hours and endogenous
effort. Introspection readily suggests those two forms to be simultaneously
at work and that income variation across households reflects both. Results
from the previous section suggest that controlling for labor supply would have
raised the benchmark for transfer derivatives to a number above unity. The
computations for the benchmark case with α = −1 put the difference T1 − T2
at about 1.5. To take this into account, we repeat the computations of the
derivative Eq. 12 to get a value for μc but now allowing the benchmark value
for T1 − T2 to exceed unity. If the empirical estimate of the transfer derivative
difference is 13 cents, we solve
0.13 =
(
1 + d − u1 (cc, 1 − eH) θU1 (cc) F
′ (Ic)
D
)
for μc, after using the first-order condition to eliminate θ . Without the
ability to adjust hours worked, d should equal 0; with endogenous hours, our
simulations suggest that d is a positive number.23 We additionally perform
sensitivity analysis by experimenting with different values of d. Results indicate
that higher target values of the transfer derivative (higher d) raise the values
obtained for μc. For example, for T1 − T2 = 1.5 (d = 0.5), expected income
under μc ranged between 89 and 75% of mean income under μ. The corre-
sponding figures for the case when the transfer derivative targeted 1.75 instead
(d = 0.75) ranged between 91 and 79%. Targeting 1.25 delivered a range for
expected income under μc between 87 and 71% of mean income under μ.
The magnitude of β2, the simulated derivative of transfers with respect
to the child’s income, is sensitive to the benchmark value considered for
T1 − T2. When that benchmark is increased, β2 increases and becomes even
more positive.24 When T1 − T2 is targeted at 1.25, β2 increases to 0.56. When
the target value of the derivative difference is 1.75 instead (d = 0.75), β2
increases further to 1.06. Therefore, our results suggest that incentives may
cause the sign of the transfer derivative with respect to the child’s income to
be symmetric to that prevailing under “pure altruism” or to the one prevailing
in situations where the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind.
23Previous computations in this section found a value for μc that solved instead
0.13 =
(
1 − u1 (cc, 1 − eH) θU1 (cc) F
′ (Ic)
D
)
.
24The values obtained for β1 do not vary with d and, as predicted by the model, that derivative is
positive under all parameter configurations considered.
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4.3 Discussion
Tests of the altruism model have generally rejected the neutrality result as very
low magnitudes for the transfer derivative difference are customarily obtained
(see Laferrère and Wolff (2006) for a revision of empirical work on altruism).
The first computation of this difference was performed by Cox and Rank
(1992), but many other examples followed suit. See, e.g., Altonji et al. (1997),
McGarry and Schoeni (1995, 1997), for American data, but also Wolff (2000),
for French data, and Jürges (1999), in Germany. Some evidence for developing
countries suggests that, in environments where public transfers are much more
limited in size and scope, more direct evidence about altruism or other transfer
motives might be uncovered. This is the case, for example, in Cox et al. (2004)
using data from the Philippines, where the transfer derivative test is met with
success when the recipient’s income is below a given threshold. Raut and Tran
(2005) also find evidence of altruism using Indonesian data.
The predictions of altruism are not of course limited to the derivative test
but they also concern—among other implications—the sign of the response of
transferred quantities with respect to the donor and recipient’s income. “Pure”
altruism predicts transfers to be compensatory, increasing in the donor’s
income and decreasing in the recipient’s. Results are also mixed here, with Cox
and Raines (1985), Cox (1987), and Cox and Rank (1992) finding a positive
relationship between amounts received and recipient’s income. However, it is
perhaps fare to say that the bulk of the evidence favors a compensatory nature
for financial transfers, with amounts going disproportionately from richer to
poorer family members and transfers found to respond to income with the
signs predicted by altruism. This is the case in Altonji et al.’s (1996, 1997) work,
McGarry and Schoeni (1995, 1997), and many others. Further, time transfers
also do not appear to be exchanged for money transfers (Altonji et al. (1996)
and Ioannides and Kan (2000), the latter also examining financial transfers).
The overall view regarding altruism is thus one where the more extreme
result of neutrality fails to find empirical support but where the compensatory
nature of financial transfers and the independence between monetary and time
transfers is broadly supported by data, if not everywhere. As Arrondel and
Masson put it, to reconcile empirical findings with altruism we need “a model
with an altruistic component that leads, nevertheless, to small compensatory
effects of transfers” (Arrondel and Masson 2006, pp:1005). The model of
incomplete information provides an answer to this quest. While quantitatively
the predictions of the endogenous hours model were ambiguous regarding
the derivative difference, the model under incomplete information predicts
that derivative differences should be strictly lower than unity, exactly what is
needed to reconcile empirical findings and altruism. Further, the quantitative
results above suggest that the model under incomplete information is capable
of fitting the data even when the endogenous choice of hours is considered.
The results under private information suggest that asymmetries of informa-
tion play an important quantitative role as the reduction in expected income
associated with low effort is nontrivial. If children chose to shirk, their income
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would be drawn from a distribution whose mean is only 84% of the mean
income they would attain instead by working hard, for the benchmark case;
this mean income reduction can be significantly more substantive for other
parameter configurations, reaching values as low as 66% in some cases. Results
under private information were found to be sensitive to the endogenous hours
benchmark for the transfer derivative difference, with smaller income reduc-
tions under low effort associated with higher values of the T1 − T2 difference.
The results in this paper suggest that empirical testing be directed at assess-
ing the relevance of private information within the family. Villanueva (2007)
finds that the extended family appears to insulate the child’s consumption
from declining when either the child or the spouse report a “physical/nervous
condition that limits amount of work.” When no family fixed effects are
considered, the reduction in consumption in the child’s household is 2 to 3
times greater relative to when those fixed effects are included (see Table 6
of Villanueva 2007).25 A disabling health condition is likely observable by the
parent, at least in part. Thus, income losses experienced during illness should
be less prone to the inference problem associated with private information and
shirking: the parent is likely to accept these as beyond the control and effort of
the child, and as being truly exogenous. Therefore, we would expect the parent
to willingly compensate a greater fraction of those losses relative to income
reductions of a general nature, as appears to be the case in the data.26
At a deeper level, this paper questions the legitimacy of testing the origi-
nal concept of Ricardian Equivalence, based on lump-sum intergenerational
redistribution, from the kind of income variation that is obtainable from
cross-sectional data, where endogenous effort in (at least) two complementary
dimensions is present and which has predictions differing from those of
Ricardian Equivalence. Clearly, income variation across households cannot
be considered “lump-sum .” Testing Ricardian Equivalence would require
finding a natural experiment such as an unexpected change in tax law, or
comparing the effects of income changes across different income categories
25Included in the prediction of altruism is the fact that consumption of individual households
within the extended family linked by positive transfers should commove perfectly and individual
income of a particular household should not have a differentiated effect on that household’s
consumption relative to that of other households in the family. This is yet another face of the redis-
tributive neutrality result. The first test of this prediction was carried out by Altonji et al. (1992).
26Villanueva conceptualizes the child’s household as having two earners, primary and secondary,
and posits that the latter is the only one with an elastic labor supply. He assumes that parents
can observe the earnings of both children but not the wages received by the secondary earner.
Simulations of the model indicate that parental transfers will compensate a larger fraction of
an income loss suffered by the primary earner compared to the secondary earner. He also tests
empirically how parental transfers respond to the earnings of both earners and finds the same
pattern in the data. Since the secondary earner is also—by assumption—the earner with greater
labor supply wage elasticity, and his simulations under complete information show that parents
also respond less to income losses of that earner, it is not clear how much of the differential
response of transfers is due to private information or simply to hourly adjustment to wage changes.
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and situations. For example, a parent might compensate a greater fraction of
income loss following the event “my child’s house burned down” relative to an
equal size reduction in permanent income whose cause is not well established.
While finding a fitting income category or a situation that would correspond to
lump-sum redistribution is a challenging task, it would appear to be the only
legitimate way of testing Ricardian Equivalence and altruism.
5 Conclusion
This paper has extended the basic model of altruism to include two com-
plementary dimensions of labor supply: endogenous hours and endogenous
effort. The explicit inclusion of labor supply allows us to differentiate the
parental transfer response to exogenous income variation—driven by events
beyond the control of the child—and which embodies the lump-sum notion
of income redistribution associated with Ricardian Equivalence, from the
transfer response to income changes that are driven by wage changes and
effort. Endogenous labor supply shows that one should not expect parental
transfers to offset income redistribution within the family unless we could
control for wages and/or hours worked, and for private information. It thus
contradicts the premise of a large body of empirical work that the lack of a
unitary difference in transfer derivatives would be a negation of altruism.
The quantitative results provided suggest that endogenous labor supply is
responsible for sizable deviations from the unitary transfer derivative bench-
mark that goes with lump-sum income redistribution. We see the results in this
paper—both theoretical and quantitative—as a challenge to future research on
the family and on the motives underlying intra-family transfers.
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